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ABSTRACT 
The Global War on Terror and recent shift of focus from 
conventional warfare to unconventional warfare reflects a 
need to replace Cold War era helicopters.  Case studies 
including the development of the AH-56 Cheyenne, OH-13 
Sioux, and the MH-60 Direct Action Penetrator provide 
reference points to develop a general premise of the 
aviation community’s ability to capitalize on technological 
innovations.   Examining the process of innovation 
throughout the history of Army Aviation will provide a 
framework to apply the concepts of innovation to the present 
and future operations of Army Aviation Special Operations.  
The diffusion of innovation theory identifies that 2.5% of 
the whole represents the true innovators.  The size of the 
160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR), 
representing approximately 5% of the entire Army aircraft 
inventory, is analogous with the concept of true innovators.  
The 160th SOAR is a great option for the integration of an 
advanced commercial aircraft, meeting the requirement for a 
specialized aircraft in Special Operations and the 
advancement of aircraft for the conventional Army.  
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A military’s ability to wage a war can be defined by 
two factors, the individuals who conduct the fight and the 
equipment that they fight with. The capability of the 
individual to fight effectively is affected by factors such 
as training, doctrine, discipline, and education, all of 
which are subjective to human nature.  For example, 
instituting a training program will ensure that the soldiers 
are properly exposed to the methods needed to fight in 
combat, but ultimately, it still comes down to the 
individual’s character traits that determine his 
effectiveness at waging war.  These “soft” factors can be 
difficult to quantify.  However, there are “hard” factors, 
such as weapons technology, that can be quantified in 
comparisons to the advantages that they may offer a military 
over their adversaries.  Even though the ultimate factor in 
winning a war comes down to the individual soldier, not 
having the correct tools and equipment to efficiently 
complete the mission can seriously degrade the probabilities 
of victory.    
Special Operations Forces (SOF) have an even greater 
responsibility placed upon them as they are considered to be 
the elite forces of the military.  These forces are given 
the responsibility of conducting high-risk missions, with 
relatively few personnel, that should ultimately have an 
effect of strategic importance.  To achieve this status of 
“special,” SOF personnel often undergo a selective screening 
process in order to distinguish their potential and 
proclivity for conducting special operations followed by 
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extensive highly specialized training.  Examples of these 
types of forces include the Navy Seals, Army Special Forces 
and the Army’s Special Aviation Unit, the 160th Special 
Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR).   The characteristics 
that distinguish these forces from conventional forces have 
been described by Tucker and Lamb as possessing political 
sophistication, having the uncommon will to succeed, 
utilizing unorthodox approaches, employing unconventional 
equipment and training, and having special intelligence 
requirements.1  This paper is focused primarily on the 
fourth characteristic of unconventional, or technologically 
superior, equipment. 
The 160th SOAR is probably even more reliant upon 
unconventional or technically superior equipment than the 
other special operations units of the U.S. Army.  The main 
purpose for the 160th in the field of special operations is 
to provide mobility to the ground SOF of the U.S. military.  
In order to most effectively conduct this mission in the 
face of any deadly adversary, their weapon platform of 
choice, the helicopter, should be technically superior in 
agility, speed, electronic countermeasures, navigational 
ability, and durability.  Often, the missions that the 160th 
is engaged in, are considered either sensitive or 
strategically important, which increase their responsibility 
of not failing in achieving the desired end state.  Thus, in 
order to successfully achieve their goals, the 160th must 
employ the best technical equipment to supply their soldiers 
with a greater probability of success.  So the question 
becomes, how can the 160th maintain a higher level of 
                     
1 David Tucker and Christopher J. Lamb, United States Special Operations 
Forces, New York: Columbia University Press, 2007, 148-149. 
 3
technically superior weapon platforms than not only those of 
their adversaries, but also to distinguish themselves from 
those of the conventional Army?   
The need for the modernization of the helicopters 
within SOF is evident in the aging fleet that is currently 
being operated.  The primary aircraft that are operated by 
the 160th include variants of the H-47 Chinook, the H-60 
Blackhawk, and the H-6 Little Bird.  All of these aircraft 
have been in production since the 1970s.2  Although these 
aircraft have undergone multiple upgrades throughout the 
past decades, they are not representative of the current 
technology, and the emerging technology that is available in 
the commercial industry.3  If the 160th SOAR, or any other 
special operations unit in the U.S. military, is to maintain 
their technological advantage over their adversaries, then 
modernization must be addressed more thoroughly and possibly 
through other innovative ways. 
At a time when the need for replacing the aging 
aircraft fleet is present, the U.S. military is currently 
involved in what has commonly been called the Global War on 
Terror.  Beginning with the fateful day of September 11, 
2001, the military has been in an ongoing war against 
multiple terrorists groups such as Al Qaeda and the Abu 
Sayaff Group.  This shift in focus of the military from 
fighting in a conventional war, with characteristics such as 
armor versus armor units and clearly delineated front lines 
                     
2 Congressional Research Service, "Military Helicopter Modernization: 
Background and Issues for Congress," By Christian F.M Liles and Christopher 
Bolkom, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2004, 1. 
3 Center for Strategic and International Studies, Special Operations Forces 
Aviation at the Crossroads, Washington, D.C., September 2007, 10. 
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of maneuver, to fighting insurgents and individual 
terrorists should reflect a need Army-wide in the weapons 
platforms that are needed to conduct the new style of war 
fighting.  On May 13, 2008, Defense Secretary Robert Gates 
described his vision for the military and future war 
fighting. 
Much of what we are talking about is a matter of 
balancing risk: today’s demands versus tomorrow’s 
contingencies; irregular and asymmetric threats 
versus conventional threats. As the world’s 
remaining superpower, we have to be able to 
dissuade, deter, and, if necessary, respond to 
challenges across the spectrum….  Nonetheless, I 
have noticed too much of a tendency towards what 
might be called “Next-War-itis” – the propensity 
of much of the defense establishment to be in 
favor of what might be needed in a future 
conflict. This inclination is understandable, 
given the dominant role the Cold War had in 
shaping America’s peacetime military, where the 
United States constantly strove to either keep up 
with or get ahead of another superpower 
adversary…. But in a world of finite knowledge 
and limited resources, where we have to make 
choices and set priorities, it makes sense to 
lean toward the most likely and lethal scenarios 
for our military….  I believe that any major 
weapons program, in order to remain viable, will 
have to show some utility and relevance to the 
kind of irregular campaigns that, as I mentioned, 
are most likely to engage America’s military in 
the coming decades.4 
The views expressed by Secretary Gates could be 
interpreted as reinforcing the need for the 160th SOAR to 
 
 
                     
4 "Secretary Gates Speech," Department of Defense, May 13, 2008. 
http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1240 (accessed 
September 10, 2008). 
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reevaluate their aging aircraft fleet and begin to determine 
what new technology could help to better prepare them for 
the current and future wars involving the U.S. 
The problem with trying to determine the type of 
technology that will best be used in future wars is having 
the correct intelligence analysis to determine what will 
provide the greatest effect on the outcome of the war.  The 
guidance by Secretary Gates has helped to alleviate some of 
that confusion.  However, as it will be shown in Chapter III 
of this paper, having the proper guidance to determine the 
best future weapon may not necessarily be the best process 
to actually acquiring the right equipment.  The problem lies 
in research, development, and implementation process.  
Designing a new aircraft around specific requirements can be 
costly and time consuming.  By the time that the aircraft is 
finally developed, the intelligence that originally informed 
the design of the aircraft may no longer be of use.  The 
question then becomes how does a military go about 
developing new technology if it may become obsolete by the 
time of its full production? 
The answer to this question may be similar to the 
controversial statement made by Former Secretary of Defense 
Donald Rumsfeld when he said, “We go to war with the weapons 
that we have.”5  This statement is not far from the truth, 
except maybe the answer should have reflected that we have 
not properly adopted our doctrine to best employ the latest 
technology that has been developed.  The history of Army 
Aviation may point to some of the problems that have been 
                     
5 Mike Mount, "Troops Put Thorny Questions to Rumsfeld," CNN, December 9, 
2004. http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/12/08/rumsfeld.troops (accessed 
September 1, 2008). 
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encountered by the Army when trying to develop new aviation 
weapon platforms.  Historical evidence may indicate that 
previously developed technology has better served the 
aviation community in times of conflict instead of trying to 
develop non-existent technology.   
The goal of this research is to conduct a qualitative 
analysis using the case study methodology to examine the 
process of innovation when using current developed 
technology vice developing an aircraft based on specific 
future requirements.  First, the history of Army Aviation 
will be examined in order to understand the evolution that 
has taken place in Army Aviation concerning the various 
types of aircraft that have been employed.  Second, the 
concept of innovation will be explored and the success and 
failures in the aviation community will be evaluated.  
Finally, a look at the role of innovation in Army Special 
Operations Aviation (ARSOA) will be conducted.  The relative 
infancy of the 160th SOAR6 allows this comparison with the 
conventional army and affords the ability to apply the 
lessons learned to the operations of the 160th.    The 
results of this paper will try to develop a concept in the 
application of innovation which should be capitalized on by 
the Army’s special operations aviation unit.   
                     
6 The 160th SOAR was officially commissioned in 1981.  When compared to the 
lifespan of the conventional Army aviation, the special operations unit is 
relatively new.  Fred J. Pushies, Night Stalkers: 160th Special Operations 
Aviation Regiment (airborne), St. Paul, MN: Zenith Press, 2005, 10. 
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II. HISTORY OF AVIATION 
The effects that innovation and technology have had on 
warfighting have been tremendous.  The 20th century 
essentially moved warfare from the two dimensional 
perspective on the ground to a third dimension in the sky.  
A review of the major changes that have happened since the 
inception of Army Aviation can highlight not only the 
dependency that aviation has on technology, but also a 
correlating change of doctrine within the Army.  The shifts 
in Army Aviation that will be portrayed are the rise of the 
hot air balloon, the invention and integration of the 
airplane and the helicopter, and finally, the invention of 
the turbine engine and its utilization in the helicopter.  
These four events mark major milestones which eventually 
lead to the creation of the 160th SOAR.  
A. HOT AIR BALLOONS 
The official birthday of the current Army Aviation 
branch did not occur until 12 April 1983; however, many 
historians link its heritage back to the late 1800s.7  Hot 
air balloons marked the first steps in the development of 
air doctrine.  The first military use of the balloon in the 
U.S. was demonstrated by Thaddeuas Lowe on 21 July 1861.  
The purpose of the flight was to conduct aerial observation 
during the battle of Bull Run.8  Later that year, the 
Balloon Corps was established as a reconnaissance unit for 
                     
7 "U.S. Army Aviation: A Proud Past," Army Aviation Museum, Jan 2, 2003. 
http://www.armyavnmuseum.org/history/past3.html (accessed November 31, 2008). 
8 James W. Williams, A History of Army Aviation: From Its Beginnings to the 
War on Terror, New York: iUniverse, 2005, 11. 
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the military.  However, the lack of knowledge in the full 
fledged capabilities in the balloon led to the Balloon Corps 
demise approximately one year after inception.   
The resurrection of the hot air balloon occurred a few 
years later by the Army’s Signal Corps.  The balloon was 
used as an effective tool for not only conducting aerial 
observation but also in transmitting messages to the 
commander’s in the field.  This could be considered one of 
the first uses of airborne command and control and helped to 
reignite interest in the air war. 
B. POWERED FLIGHT 
The first powered air platform (the airplane) indicated 
a radical change in the operational capabilities of the 
Army.  The use of aerial platforms had already been 
established by the use of the hot air balloon in the 
Spanish-American war.  The Army now had it sights on the 
first practical airplane.  The first flight by the Wright 
brothers in 1903 would signify this change.  Unfortunately, 
it was not until four years later when the Army began to 
realize the potential of the airplane.  In 1908, the Wright 
brothers demonstrated their invention to a board of officers 
from the Signal Corp and governmental officials to include 
President Theodore Roosevelt.9  The test flight was a huge 
success meeting all of the requirements that the Army 
believed it needed.   
                     
9 James W. Bradin, From Hot Air to Hellfire, Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 
1994,  50. 
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The air services branch of the Army was formally 
established in 1914.10 Utilization of the airplane to 
support the troops of the ground had finally taken hold.  
The airplane was seen as the wave of the future and was 
increasingly becoming a priority for the military.  The 
strategic and tactical importance of the airplane was being 
developed and eventually championed by Col. Billy Mitchell.  
Mitchell understood the tactical importance of the airplane 
in its ability to support the troops on the ground.  He also 
understood the strategic and operational importance in the 
future of bombing missions.  The bombing missions are what 
eventually became the focus of the Army Air Force and would 
ultimately become the catalyst for the separation between 
the Army and its Air Corps. 
C. THE HELICOPTER 
During the quick rise of the airplane, a lesser known 
air platform was also being developed, the helicopter.  The 
concept of the helicopter has roots that go as far back as 
DaVinci with his drawings of a screw type rotor.11  However, 
DaVinci’s drawing never made it any further than the drawing 
board.  The necessary engineering practices were not 
available, not to mention the internal combustion engine. 
The first practical attempts of the helicopter were 
pursued by various inventors to include Louis and Jacques 
Breguet, Paul Cornu, and Etienne Oehmichen.12   Igor 
                     
10 James W. Bradin, From Hot Air to Hellfire, 1994, 51. 
11 "Pioneers: The Beginning." Helis, http://www.helis.com/pioneers/ 
(accessed November 31, 2008). 
12 Tony Landis and Dennis R. Jenkins, "Lockheed AH-56A Cheyenne." Warbird 
Tech Series, Vol. 27, Specialty Press Publishers and Wholesalers, 2000, 9-10. 
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Sikorsky, a Russian immigrant to the United States, 
ultimately produced the first true helicopter that was 
practical.  The year 1939 became a milestone in the future 
history of Army Aviation, when he developed the VS-300, a 
helicopter design that utilized the anti-torque rotor on the 
tail of the aircraft which allowed the helicopter the 
ability to hover, a feat which clearly distinguished this 
new type of aircraft from any others.13  The success of this 
helicopter piqued the interest of the U.S. Army and in 1941 
the Army received its first YR-4, an adaptation of the VS-
300. 
The helicopters of the 1940s and the 1950s had very 
limited capabilities.  The piston driven engine coupled with 
the available metallurgy practices of the time reduced 
characteristics such as airspeed and payload.  Despite these 
limitations, the helicopter saw plenty of action in the 
Korean War.  The results of the Korean War and the 
employment of the helicopter by the Marines for emergency 
troop lifts began to grease the wheels (or skids) for 
further utilization of the helicopter.  But for this to 
occur, new strides in technology would first have to take 
place. 
D. TURBINE ERA 
The invention of the gas turbine engine by Sir Frank 
Whittle in 193014 set the stage for a radical advancement in 
the field of rotary-wing aircraft.  This engine would 
require less maintenance than the piston type, increased the 
                     
13 Tony Landis and Dennis R. Jenkins, "Lockheed AH-56A Cheyenne," 2000, 10. 
14 NASA. Ultra Efficient Engine Technology, 
http://www.ueet.nasa.gov/studentsite/engines.html, (accessed December 1, 2008). 
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power to weight ratio, and was much simpler to operate than 
previous engines.15  The first helicopter to be flown with a 
turbine engine was the Kaman K-225 in 1951.  Coincidently, 
three years later, Major General James Gavin wrote an 
article “Cavalry, and I Don’t Mean Horses,” which expounded 
upon the idea of using helicopter as a means to creating 
highly mobile ground forces.16   Gavin’s idea was now 
possible with the use of the turbine engine powered 
helicopter which increased the helicopter’s airspeed and 
payload capability. 
The Howze Board of 1962 was the final ingredient that 
cemented the helicopter’s role in the Army.  The findings of 
the board recommended the creation of an Air Assault 
division which would be based around the UH-1 Huey 
helicopter.17  The Huey was the first turbine engine 
helicopter that the Army procured and boasted a cruise speed 
of 110 knots and a maximum speed of 120 knots.18  It was the 
speed of these aircraft that allowed for the concept of air 
mobility to be realized.  The Huey helicopter would later 
become known as the “backbone… of the army’s helicopter 
fleet.”19 
                     
15 Piston engines required manual operation of the throttle by the pilot 
which affected the rotor speed.  The turbine engine operated with the use of a 
governor which helped to regulate rotor RPMs.  In James W. Williams, A History 
of Army Aviation: From Its Beginnings to the War on Terror, 2005, 65. 
16 J.A. Stockfisch, The 1962 Howze Board and Army Combat Developments, Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND, 1994, 8. 
17 James W. Williams, A History of Army Aviation: From Its Beginnings to the 
War on Terror, 2005, 66. 
18 J.A. Stockfisch, The 1962 Howze Board and Army Combat Developments, 1994, 
19. 
19 James W. Bradin, From Hot Air to Hellfire, 1994, 104. 
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E. CREATION OF ARMY AVIATION SPECIAL OPERATIONS 
In late 1979, a group of U.S. hostages were taken 
prisoner by a group of Iranian students at the U.S. embassy.  
After months of negotiation by the Carter administration, a 
plan was developed that would utilize the country’s newest 
asset, Delta Force. This mission, named Operation Eagle 
Claw, was deemed so secret that even the members of the 
force were only vaguely familiar with the other units that 
were participating in the operation.  It has been claimed 
that at their first link up point, named Desert One, some of 
the members would meet each other for the first time.20    
The aviation portion of the plan turned out to be the 
weak point in the operation.  There were many different 
variables that were used to determine which type of aircraft 
was to be used and which military branch the pilots were to 
come from.  Ultimately, the Navy’s RH-53D was selected due 
to its extended range fuel tanks and payload capability.  
The pilots who were chosen to fly the mission were from the 
Marines based upon their perceived ability to conduct ground 
assault type missions.21  The decision to mix and match 
aircraft and their respective pilots was one of the first 
indications of poor planning and coordination.   
Difficulties were encountered on the infiltration route due 
to poor weather, a lack of anti-aircraft weapons 
intelligence, and poor technology.  After six of the eight 
aircraft arrived at Desert One, an additional aircraft was 
deemed unable to continue due to a faulty hydraulic system.  
                     
20 Lucien S. Vandenbroucke, Perilous Options: Special Operations as an 




At this point, the mission was aborted and arrangements were 
made to exfiltrate the force.  As the aircraft were 
repositioning to depart, a helicopter collided with a C-130 
transport aircraft leaving 8 Americans to die in the Iranian 
desert.  A congressional investigation that later took place 
found that lack of coordination and planning was a key 
element in the failure of Operation Eagle Claw.22 
After the fiasco at Desert One, an Army helicopter task 
force was immediately constituted.  These aircraft were 
gathered from the 101st Aviation Group, which had seen 
extensive action while deployed to Vietnam.  These aircraft 
and their pilots began to train extensively in the desert, 
near Yuma, Arizona, while using night vision goggles in 
order to fly a proposed follow on mission in Iran.23  The 
second mission never took place; however, the foundation for 
the 160th SOAR had been laid.  
The missions that the 160th has been involved in 
include everything from insertion of Special Forces members 
for special reconnaissance (SR) missions, to rescue 
missions, to providing close air support.  The first mission 
that the 160th conducted was part of Operation Urgent Fury 
in Grenada.  The 160th was involved in at least three 
portions of the operation.  They were tasked with inserting 
a SEAL team for the purpose of securing a radio transmitter, 
inserting another SEAL team to conduct an assault on the 
Governor-General’s Mansion, and assaulting the Richmond Hill 
Prison to secure senior advisors of the Revolutionary 
                     
22 Lucien S. Vandenbroucke, Perilous Options: Special Operations as an 
instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy, 1993, , 128-132. 
23 Fred J. Pushies, Night Stalkers: 160th Special Operations Aviation 
Regiment (airborne), St. Paul, MN: Zenith Press, 2005, 14-15. 
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Military Council 24.  The Richmond Hill Prison mission did 
not occur as planned due to the extreme amount of enemy fire 
that was encountered when the aircraft were approaching the 
prison and was subsequently aborted.  The other two missions 
were accomplished with varying degrees of success.   
Operation Desert Storm provided the first opportunity 
for the entire Regiment to be deployed.  Many of the 
missions conducted by the 160th involved insertions of 
Special Forces for SR missions.  A new mission assumed by 
the 160th involved the locating and destroying of the 
infamous SCUD missile.  A modified MH-60 Blackhawk, called a 
direct-action penetrator (DAP), was used in this endeavor.  
This aircraft had the ability to be armed with either 
hellfire missiles or stinger missiles, whichever was needed 
for the mission, and gave the 160th a more robust firepower 
than it had previously held.   
Operation Gothic Serpent in Somalia is probably one of 
the more well known operations conducted by the 160th.  
Conducted in October 1993, the 160th was the aviation 
component of Task Force Ranger.  Although this operation 
clearly showed some shortcomings of the special operations 
community, it displayed the wide range of capabilities 
possessed by the 160th.  During this operation, the 160th 
inserted Delta members using the MH-6 Little Bird, inserted 
Rangers using the MH-60 Blackhawk, and provided close air 
support to the ground forces with the AH-6 Light Attack 
Helicopter. 
                     
24 Fred J. Pushies, Night Stalkers: 160th Special Operations Aviation 
Regiment (airborne), 2005, 36-38. 
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The creation of the 160th was the result of multiple 
procedural and technological innovations.  Since its 
inception, the 160th has continued to hone both their skills 
in aviation operations to include nap-of-the-earth flying25 
techniques while using night vision goggles.  Their motto, 
“Night Stalker’s don’t quit,” is emblematic of their pursuit 
in perfection.  
 
                     
25  Nap-of-the-earth flying is a flying technique where the helicopter is 
flying at altitudes of 0-40 ft above ground level. 
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III. AVIATION TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION:  
SUCCESSES AND FAILURES 
A. INNOVATION AND THE MILITARY  
The goal for any military is ultimately to have the 
capabilities to defeat enemy combatants when called upon, 
whether it is for the purpose of the defense of the 
homeland, to aid in the survival of an allied nation, or in 
more modern times, to defeat the goals of international 
terrorism.  The U.S. Army has presumably strived to maintain 
this goal of achieving victory by adapting to the ever-
changing battlefield.  These adaptations have come in many 
forms, whether they are in the organizational design of the 
various units or the technology that is needed to have the 
tactical advantage over their opponents.  The technological 
adaptation or attempt thereof, is what is of concern in this 
section of the paper, specifically, the Army’s ability to 
adapt to the changing needs and ever growing field of 
aviation technology.  The conflict in aviation is whether 
the pursuit of existent technology or emerging technology 
should be undertaken.  An example of this conflict could be 
described as the decision to invest and pursue an 
undeveloped aircraft design or should an aircraft that has 
already been tested and evaluated primarily in the civilian 
sector be acquired then modified as needed for military 
application.  First, some terms and ideas that govern the 
concept of innovation will be discussed along with the 
relationship of innovation with the military.  Next, a look 
at Army Aviation’s track record in attaining the perceived 
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necessary changes in technology will then be discussed 
followed by a summary and review of the successes and 
failures that have been attained by the aviation branch.   
Army Aviation is a branch that is closely tied with 
technology that is either presently available or attainable.  
It is this relationship that requires the Army to constantly 
seek out, either through internal research and development 
programs, or external private companies, the latest and most 
advanced forms of technology.  These new technologies are 
often referred to as either inventions or innovations.  The 
Organization for Economic Development describes innovation 
as the “implementation of a new or significantly improved 
product” and a product innovation as “the introduction of a 
good or service that is new or significantly improved with 
respect to its characteristics or intended uses.”26 
Innovations, or the products thereof, can often be the 
driving force behind new military doctrine.  Although this 
at first may seem counterintuitive, a quick explanation 
should be made.  The common process that drives the need for 
new weapon systems should be the strategic necessities as 
determined by the National Security Strategy.  This strategy 
should, in the best way possible, try to determine the types 
of future conflicts.  Using this knowledge, military leaders 
should either try to determine if their current inventory of 
weapon platforms are capable of completing the forecasted 
mission requirements or if a new weapon is required.  
However, as one very well knows, trying to develop a weapon 
for long term future utilization is probably only possible 
if they have a crystal ball that truly works.    Martin Van 
                     
26 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Data, Oslo Manual: Guidelines 
for Collecting and Interpreting Innovative Data, OECD Publishing, 2005,  46. 
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Creveld notes that “during the twentieth century, too, none 
of the most important devices that have transformed war… 
owed its origins to a doctrinal requirement laid down by 
people in uniform….”27  Utilizing this logic, the idea could 
then be presented that if doctrine doesn’t necessarily drive 
military innovation, then it could be possible that military 
innovation affects doctrine.  New innovations in the arena 
of Army Aviation have demonstrated this effect time and time 
again, such as the cases of the AH-56 Cheyenne and the 
infamous RAH-66 Comanche.  Why is it that the developments 
of new platforms initially sanctioned by the Army have 
failed?  The lessons and insights that can be learned from 
the conventional Army’s track record should provide insight 
to the effective use of innovation when concerned with the 
acquisition of new aircraft.  
In the field of technological innovation, there are 
some principles that may help to guide and determine the 
importance of innovation in Aviation operations.  Everett M. 
Rogers describes a diffusion of innovation theory that may 
help to determine why some of the projects sanctioned by the 
Army never took off.  The theory divides the beneficiaries 
of innovation into five groups, the innovators, the early 
adopters, the early majority, the late majority, and the 
laggards.28  After conducting a study Rogers determined that 
the number of people that readily fell into the most 
important group here, the innovators, was only 2.5 out of 
100.  This begs the question then, how is a large 
                     
27 Martin Van Creveld,  Technology and War: From 2000 B.C. to the Present, 
New York: The Free Press, 1991, 220. 
28 Everett M. Rogers,  Diffusion of Innovations, New York: Free Press, 2003,  
283-285. 
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bureaucracy, like the military, supposed to be expected to 
readily consume new innovations and maintain the patience 
needed to see a project through to completion?  The answer 
may be in the form of a maverick.  Mavericks can play an 
integral role in the foundation of an organization when it 
comes to innovation.  Billy Mitchell may well be one of the 
more famous mavericks associated with Army Aviation.29  
Using the diffusion of innovation theory, then, it may be 
important for the military to actually embrace these 
mavericks, or free thinkers, when it comes to Army Aviation.  
This approach is only one of the possibilities to curb 
institutional sluggishness in obtaining the proper aircraft 
for future wars.  The initial problem of obtaining the 
aircraft through the correct process still persists. 
The sources of innovation in the military can be broken 
down into two broad categories, the commercial sector and 
internal research and development.  The commercial sector, 
the primary supplier for aviation development, may often be 
funded by the Department of Defense, but there are also 
cases where a company has developed technology from their 
own financial resources to win a military contract in the 
future or simply to improve their aerospace toolkit.  The 
“dual use” of aviation products (commercial and military) 
often provides additional incentive for technological 
advances.30  In fact, the Army has often been better served 
 
                     
29 Billy Mitchell was a military aviator who supported the strategy of 
airpower amid staunch military opposition. 
30 Allan R. Millett,  "Patterns of Military Innovation in the Interwar 
Period," In Military Innovation in the Interwar Period, by Williamson Murray 
and Allan R. Millett, 329-368. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, 
348. 
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by capitalizing on these advancements made by private 
companies instead of trying to design an aircraft destined 
only for military use. 
The success and failures of technological innovation 
can be found throughout the history of Army Aviation.  To 
help display how these processes have worked in the past, 
several cases will be looked at to include: the AH-56, the 
RAH-66, OH-13, COL Vanderpool’s team, and finally the Direct 
Action Penetrator maintained by the 160th.    
B. AH-56 CHEYENNE 
The new practice of conducting assaults through the use 
of helicopters during the Vietnam War was a doctrine that 
was essentially being baptized by fire.  During the course 
of the initial air assaults, it was discovered that the air 
convoys consisting of utility helicopters were in need of an 
armed escort.  One of the primary requirements for this 
armed helicopter was speed.  The CH-47 Chinook had an 
airspeed of up to 170 knots which was too slow to be 
accompanied by a fixed-wing aircraft and too fast for an 
armed UH-1 which operated at an airspeed of 120 knots.  In 
order to address this problem, the Army sent out a request 
for proposal (RFP) to the commercial industry to develop an 
aircraft that was capable of speeds that were commensurate 
with the Chinook.  Of the twelve companies that pursued the 
requirement, two stood out above the rest, Sikorsky with the 
S-79 and Lockheed with the XH-56.  On November 3, 1965, 
Lockheed was awarded a contract to develop and produce their 
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aircraft designated by the Army as the AH-56.31  The AH-56 
was revolutionary in design.  The advantages of AH-56 lay in 
its sleek airplane-like fuselage, advanced suite of 
avionics, wings, but most importantly, a push-type propeller 
that was attached to the rear of the aircraft.  The rear 
propeller, combined with the stub wings, allowed the 
helicopter to reduce the lift requirements of the main 
rotor, which in turn, allowed the aircraft to reach speeds 
up to 215 knots.32  After seven years of development and 
testing, the aircraft never reached the full production 
stage because of a vibration in the main rotor. 
The criticism of the AH-56 program is that the 
helicopter was discarded too early due to politics.33  
Ironically, in 1973, Lockheed had fixed the vibration 
problem in the Cheyenne, one year after Congress had 
cancelled the program.  The Cheyenne could have been the 
Army’s most technologically advanced aircraft in the fleet 
had they utilized patience and fully understood the future 
implications of its utilization.  However, the Army can’t be 
completely faulted as the original intended use of the 
Cheyenne was to escort utility helicopters conducting air 
assaults in the Vietnam War.  By the time that the Cheyenne 
had finally come close to fruition the immediate need for an 
armed escort helicopter had dissipated with the withdrawal 
from the Vietnam War.   
                     
31 Tony Landis and Dennis R. Jenkins, "Lockheed AH-56A Cheyenne," Warbird 
Tech Series, Vol. 27, Specialty Press Publishers and Wholesalers, 2000, 20. 
32 Tony Landis and Dennis R. Jenkins. "Lockheed AH-56A Cheyenne," 2000, 81.  
33 Frederic A. Bergerson,  The Army Gets an Air Force: Tactics of Insurgent 
Bureaucratic Politics, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980, 64. 
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The Cheyenne aircraft is an example of Army Aviation 
attempting to build a helicopter from non-tested technology.  
The current doctrine that was being developed, air assaults, 
had determined that a new type of aircraft was needed to 
fill the void.  Since there was not an aircraft yet 
developed that was fast enough to stay with the Chinooks, 
the Army decided to develop one on their own.   
C. RAH-66 
Technology in the 1980’s and the 1990’s had opened up 
new windows of opportunity for the Army to develop a new 
aircraft.  Attempting to capitalize on this era, the 
development of the RAH-66 Comanche commenced.  The RAH-66 
was to be the most advanced aircraft of its time utilizing 
stealth technology to reduce its radar signature and 
advanced avionics and weapons packages which would increase 
its lethality and durability.  The RAH-66 was originally 
designed to be a multi-mission air platform.  Initial 
proposals for the Comanche included utility and 
reconnaissance variants with the option to develop an attack 
variant.34  After a revision in the program, the utility 
variant was cut from the program focusing the Comanche 
primarily on the reconnaissance role of Army Aviation.   
Ultimately, after multiple revisions to the program, the 
Comanche was destined to replace the OH-58 Kiowa Warrior and 
supplement the AH-64 Apache.35  
                     
34  Congressional Research Service, "Army Aviation: The RAH-66 Comanche 
Helicopter Issue," By Christopher Bolkom, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, 2003, 1. 
35  Ibid., 3. 
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The Comanche aircraft program was discontinued in 2003.  
After over 20 years of developing new technology, conducting 
multiple tests and evaluations, and investing $7 billion 
into the program, the Comanche program was determined to be 
too costly to reach full production along with no longer 
being relevant to the needs of Army Aviation.36  The 
successes of the Kiowa and the Apache in the Gulf War of 
1991 and Operation Enduring Freedom revalidated each of 
those aircraft’s effectiveness.  The money saved from 
cutting the program allowed aircraft upgrades to be made to 
the Army’s existing fleet.  Once again, an attempt at 
designing a new aircraft failed.  The positive side to this 
venture was the application of the technology derived from 
the Comanche and applying it to the target systems of the 
Apaches.  Yet, the process of acquiring a new helicopter 
airframe still seems to be elusive.   
D. OH-13 SIOUX 
One example of a successful venture in aircraft 
acquisition comes in the form of the OH-13.  During the 
1940s, Larry Bell, the founder of Bell Helicopters, had 
recognized the increased opportunity in the aviation 
industry for the utilization of helicopters in the U.S. 
military.  Moving forward with this insight, Bell 
Helicopters began on their path of innovation and developed 
through their own financial resources the Bell Model 30.37  
Building on this model, with the help of Arthur Young, Bell 
Helicopters later went on to produce the Bell Model 47 in 
                     
36 Congressional Research Service, "Army Aviation: The RAH-66 Comanche 
Helicopter Issue." By Christopher Bolkom, 2003. 
37 James W. Bradin, From Hot Air to Hellfire, 1994, 80. 
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1945.38  The Model 47 was destined to be one of the first 
actively deployed helicopters by the U.S. Army.  In 1946, 
after displaying the capabilities of the Model 47 to the 
Army, the Army procured 13 of these helicopters and was 
later given the designation of OH-13.39 
The OH-13 is probably most famous for its service 
during the Korean conflict.  Known as the “Angel of mercy,” 
the OH-13 evacuated more than twenty one thousand wounded 
soldiers.40  The OH-13 was a simple airframe that had been 
developed by the commercial industry primarily through the 
insights of its founder, Larry Bell, and the designer Arthur 
Young.  The initial design of this aircraft did not involve 
any tedious requests directly from the Army as far as design 
specifications.  Even though the helicopter was built in the 
civilian industry, the Army was able to capitalize on the 
OH-13’s technology and utilize the aircraft, with few 
modifications, to serve a significant role in the Korean 
Conflict.  Innovation in this context was best served by the 
Army adopting new technology from the commercial industry 
and adapting its capabilities to existing doctrine, in this 
case, emergency evacuation. 
                     
38 "Bell Timeline," Helis, http://www.helis.com/timeline/bell.php, (accessed 
November 16, 2008). 
39 Howard A. Wheeler, Attack Helicopters: A History of Rotary-Wing Combat 
Aircraft, Balitmore, MD: The Nautical and Aviation Publishing Company of 
America, 1987, 19. 
40 James W. Bradin, From Hot Air to Hellfire, 1994, 87. 
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E. COLONEL VANDERPOOL’S TEAM 
The conflict between the Air Force and the Army over 
the role of close combat support41 helped to ignite the 
process of innovation in the Army aviation community in the 
development of what should be called its first attack 
aircraft.  The ground forces of the Army had begun to feel 
that the Air Force was not committed to its mission of 
providing close air support.42  In order to rectify this 
perceived deficiency, General Hutton, the commandant for the 
Arm’s Aviation School, had decided to use Training Directive 
Number 13 as a loophole to explore the possibilities of 
arming current Army helicopters.43  Pursuing this venture, 
Gen Hutton employed the talents of Colonel Jay Vanderpool, 
Chief of the Combat Developments Office, to explore the 
realm of arming helicopters.  Vanderpool, a non-aviation 
officer, readily accepted the challenge, first by 
consolidating a group of men that had skills in metal 
fabrication, and secondly, by contacting the helicopter 
manufacturers to determine the strength and weaknesses of 
the airframes.  During 1956 and 1957, Vanderpool’s 
initiative had proved to be revolutionary.  Successful 
                     
41 The memorandum of Understanding of 1951 placed restrictions on the 
capabilities of Army Aircraft.  The Army was to only use its aircraft for air 
reconnaissance, command and control, aerial wire laying, and the transportation 
of supplies.  The Army was instructed to not duplicate any of the missions that 
were already being performed by the Air Force such as assault transport, close 
combat support, or interdiction. In Richard P. Weinert Jr., A History of Army 
Aviation: 1950-1962, Fort Monroe, VA: Office of the Command Historian, 1991, 
20. 
42 James W. Bradin, From Hot Air to Hellfire, 1994, 92. 
43 “Memorandum No. 13… emphasized the need for new concepts in mobility and 
flexible organization…,” in Richard P. Weinert Jr., A History of Army Aviation: 
1950-1962, 1991, 160. 
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weapon’s firing had been demonstrated utilizing the OH-13 
with .30 caliber and .50 caliber machine guns.44 
Successful innovation took place in this scenario 
because of the initiative of two officers, Gen Hutton and 
Col Vanderpool.  Due to their loose interpretation of a 
training memorandum, these two innovators were to set the 
stage for the era of the attack helicopter.  The important 
point to notice in this instance is that the only new 
technology that was developed in this case was the mounts 
that held the weapons to the airframe.  The OH-13 Sioux had 
already been in production for over 10 years at the point of 
test firing weapons.  New technology wasn’t developed in the 
face of a requirement but was converted to be utilized to 
meet the Army’s need. 
F. DIRECT ACTION PENETRATOR (DAP) 
The final case study involves the Army’s special 
operations aviation unit.  Probably one of the greatest 
utilization of innovation by the 160th SOAR comes in the 
form of the Direct Action Penetrator (DAP).  The DAP is a 
modified MH-60 Black Hawk that has been outfitted with 
various different types of weapons including 2.75 folding-
fin aerial rockets, a 30mm chain gun, and a .50 caliber 
Gatlin gun.45  The idea for arming the Black Hawk is 
attributed to Cliff Wolcott, a member of the 160th SOAR.  
Wolcott was part of the Systems Integration and Management 
Office (SIMO) which manages the integration of “a new weapon 
                     
44 James W. Bradin, From Hot Air to Hellfire, 1994, 97. 
45 Fred J. Pushies, Night Stalkers: 160th Special Operations Aviation 
Regiment (airborne), St. Paul MN: Zenith Press, 2005, 99-100. 
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or nav[sic] system” on the 160th’s aircraft.46  The first 
true test of the DAP came during the Gulf War where the DAP 
was used as a scud hunter and is credited with obtaining the 
first confirmed helicopter kill of a scud.47  
The innovation behind the DAP involved the “retooling” 
of existing technology to fill a perceived void in 
capabilities.  The DAP provided the 160th with an armed 
helicopter that could “fly low at night, go long distances 
and survive better than any helicopter.”48  Instead of 
pursuing a completely new airframe with untested technology, 
the 160th was innovative in their endeavors to utilize what 
was readily available. 
G. INNOVATION APPLIED 
These four case studies supply a broad overview of the 
successes and failures of innovation in Army Aviation.  
Generally, the successful procurement of new helicopters has 
often been the result of the acquired helicopter already 
having been tested and evaluated in the commercial sector.  
Current aircraft in the Army’s fleet that fit this mold 
include the OH-58 Kiowa Warrior which was based on the Bell 
Model 206 and the CH-47 which is a derivative of the Model 
107, which was later modified into the model 114.   The 
examples of the first attempt to arm a helicopter by Col 
Vanderpool and later the arming of the Black Hawk helicopter 
by the 160th were accomplished by using previously proven 
                     
46 Michael J. Durant and Steven Hartov, In the Company of Heroes, New York: 
G.P. Putnam's Sons, 2003, 162. 
47 Ibid., 300-301. 
48 "Special Operations Forces Reveal Armed Black Hawk Helicopter," Defense 
Daily, April 3, 1995, http://proquest.umi.com (accessed November 5, 2008). 
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technology and adapting that technology to fit the mission 
requirements.  Attempts to build new airframes such as the 
AH-56 and the RAH-66 required radical new technology that 
had yet to be proven in the commercial industry.  The 
foresight to build new technology was well intentioned by 
Army Aviation, but the lesson to be learned is that 
“commercial off the shelf” (COTS) products are just as 
adaptable to current mission needs and require less time to 
be put into production. 
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IV. ROLE OF INNOVATION IN AVIATION SPECIAL 
OPERATIONS 
A. FOCUS OF TECHNOLOGY 
A special operations unit should be “specifically 
organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support 
special operations.”49  Maximizing the capabilities of the 
equipment and exploiting new innovations helps to provide 
Special Operations (SO) with a greater tactical advantage 
over their adversaries.   The 160th SOAR has strived to 
maintain their uniqueness with their specially selected and 
trained pilots and some of the most technologically upgraded 
aircraft.  The problem remains though, how long can upgrades 
to an aging aircraft fleet continue to keep the 160th ahead 
of the competition?  In the evolving global stage of 
conflict, the aircraft currently employed by the 160th 
represent those that were crucial and successful during the 
Cold War.  As it has been referenced earlier, the new war is 
against terrorism and insurgency.  “Long term success rests 
on the ability of the U.S. and its allies to deny terrorist 
organizations the sources of power that sustain their 
efforts.” 50  This change in focus could be seen as a need 
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Government Printing Office, 2001. 
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for a change in the aircraft fleet, or at least a portion of 
it, to help SO aviation maintain their special edge over 
those of their contemporaries.   
The path to achieving this edge lies in technological 
innovation and Army Special Operations Aviation’s (ARSOAs) 
ability to capitalize upon it.   In order to explore this 
idea, a review of what drives the missions of SO will be 
examined and correlated to the requirements that should be 
on their aircraft.  Second, a discussion of Major Force 
Program 11 (MFP-11) will take place to examine its impact on 
the abilities of SO to innovate.  Finally, a look at how the 
160th has fared in the past with innovation and the 
obstacles that they must overcome will be provided. 
B. CORE TASKS 
The primary missions that special operations forces are 
responsible for are referred to as core tasks and include 
“direct action, special reconnaissance, foreign internal 
defense, unconventional warfare, counterterrorism, 
counterproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, civil 
affairs operations, psychological operations, and 
information operations.”51  These tasks are not necessarily 
designed to be conducted by any one unit but they help to 
inform individual units of the requirements, such as 
training and equipment that they should employ to be 
successful.  The history of 160th‘s missions as described in 
Chapter Two, indicate that they often act in the realm of 
direct action and counterterrorism missions.  In the current 
                     
51 Joint Staff Directorate. Joint Publication 3-05: Doctrine for Joint 
Special Operations, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2003, II-3. 
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environment, as SOCOM spearheads the campaign against 
terrorism, a reconfiguration of the aircraft of the 160th 
should be pursued to operate in the role of 
counterterrorism.    The current aircraft that the 160th 
employs such as the MH-60 Blackhawk and the MH-47 Chinook 
are good aircraft for inserting special operators into non-
permissive environments, but the capability to increase the 
160th’s efficiency may lie in their requirements for a more 
specialized aircraft.   Characteristics such as increased 
speed coupled with a lower probability of detection would 
seem to be the linchpin for successfully targeting 
terrorists in a non-permissive environment. 
C. FINANCING TECHNOLOGY 
The approach taken by ARSOA in technological innovation 
primarily rests on the integration of new technology into 
existing platforms.  The reasons for this approach are 
varied but have been attributed to the wording of MFP-11.  
MFP-11 was established in 1987 to provide “the [Special 
Operations] Command with funding authority for the 
development and acquisition of equipment, materials, 
supplies, and services peculiar to special operations. 
Legislation makes the military services responsible for 
providing standard equipment and supplies to their forces 
assigned to unified combatant commands.” 52  The standard 
equipment, in the case of the 160th, could refer to 
something as small as a hand-held survival radio up to an 
entire airframe.  Most of the aircraft operated by the 160th 
                     
52 "Special Operations Forces: Force Structure and Readiness Issues." Global 
Security, March 24, 1994, 
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are currently operated by the conventional army and are thus 
referred to as “service common”.  The Little Bird, the only 
aircraft solely operated by the 160th, was previously used 
by the conventional army, but was replaced by the OH-58 
Kiowa Warrior.  Reasons for the dual use of aircraft by 
conventional and special units of the Army include reduced 
costs for aircraft research and development (R&D) and the 
reduction in logistical requirements.  To exploit the intent 
of MFP-11, the services have primarily used the funds for 
upgrades to the aircraft in order to enhance their 
capabilities beyond those of the conventional forces. 
Exploiting emerging technology and innovations has been 
key in the 160th’s ability to maintain a technologically 
advanced aircraft fleet.  The production of the DAP by the 
160th is a great example of innovation. Another example 
includes the introduction of an advanced warning system in 
the 2000s which was later adapted by the conventional 
army.53   Also in 2000, a new rotor system was developed for 
the H-6 Little Bird to decrease rotor noise and increase 
stability.  The list of upgrades for the aircraft is long 
and continuous and has generally helped to provide 
advantages to the 160th’s capabilities.  The current plans 
in ARSOA include more upgrades to the avionics and 
navigation systems and aircraft survivability systems. 54  
However, despite all of these upgrades, the 160th still 
maintains an aircraft fleet that has its roots in the 
Vietnam Era. 
                     
53 Congressional Research Service. "Military Helicopter Modernization: 
Background and Issues for Congress." By Christian F.M Liles and Christopher 
Bolkom, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2004, 4-7. 
54 Ibid., 4. 
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D. OBSTACLES TO INNOVATION 
Mention of the obstacles faced by the Special 
Operations Aviation community in obtaining a truly 
specialized aircraft should be made.  Developing a brand new 
aircraft for the Army requires a relatively large financial 
investment in the research and development phase of the 
program, sometimes accounting for up to 15 percent of the 
entire program.55  The final cost per aircraft could range 
anywhere from nine to twenty four million dollars, depending 
on the number of aircraft that are ultimately procured.  The 
Army’s aviation acquisition programs are designed to procure 
aircraft for the entire Army which maintains approximately 
3500 rotary wing platforms to include the helicopters of 
ARSOA which account for approximately 180 aircraft.  The 
high cost of aircraft, including the research and 
development, combined with the tradition of utilizing 
service common aircraft, make it difficult for ARSOA to 
procure their own aircraft.  However, today’s highly 
technological commercial industry, which has the incentive 
to invest their own finances into R&D, helps to offset some 
of the total costs of an aviation program.  The 
corresponding cost savings, combined with the small numbers 
of aircraft that would be procured solely by special 
operations, may indicate that a helicopter designed for the 
sole use of Special Operations may be a practical goal. 
 
                     
55 Percentage derived from table 1-2 in Congressional Budget Office. 
Modernizing the Army's Rotary Wing Aviation Fleet, Washington, D.C., November 
2007, 5. 
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The implementation of MFP-11, designed to procure 
equipment peculiar to special operations, has partially 
stymied the potential for future innovation in Special 
Operations.  The onus of procurement remains with the 
conventional Army which reduces the initiative of ARSOA.  
Nevertheless, the small size of the 160th could allow 
opportunities to perfect new and untried techniques and 
technologies by an organization that employs some of the 
best aviators add the Army.  The role of innovation in 
Aviation Special Operations should not be limited merely to 
upgrades of existing Army inventory, but should also attempt 
to incorporate new emerging aircraft from commercial 
industry that have the potential to meet the current and 
future doctrinal needs of ARSOA. 
E. TIME FOR CHANGE 
The need and opportunity for a new aircraft 
specifically designed for Special Operations is present.  
The importance and fluidity of the environment where SOCOM 
is taking the lead on combating terrorism presents the 
opportunities necessary to begin changing the approaches to 
innovation.   Applying technological upgrades to legacy 
aircraft has worked well in the past.   The aircraft fleet 
of the 160th has up until now, been able to keep up with 
requirements for their missions.  But, as pointed out 
previously, military units have difficulty in adopting new 
tactics based upon old technology.  Rotary wing technology 
has advanced significantly over the past twenty years.  
Sikorsky has recently unveiled a new model which boasts 
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cruising speeds of up to 250 knots.56  This type of aircraft 
could have implications on the ways that the 160th conducts 
their missions.  A faster special operations helicopter 
could facilitate a faster response time and the ability to 
react to real time intelligence resulting in the increased 
efficiency to capture or kill designated terrorists or 
insurgents.  Other advantages of a faster, more 
technologically advanced helicopter could include a decrease 
in reaction time by the potential targets and a quicker self 
deployment timeframe which may reduce interagency 
dependency.   Incorporating a fresh new technologically 
advanced aircraft into the fleet of ARSOA could force a 
change in doctrine that is better adapted for fighting in an 
unconventional war against terrorism and insurgents. 
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Innovation is spontaneous, dictates a level of 
uncertainty, and can be difficult to manage.  Trying to 
determine the best weapon platform for future wars is 
difficult.  It took the Army four years following the 
invention of the aircraft to realize the value that it would 
add to warfighting.  Bell helicopters designed a helicopter 
well ahead of the Army even realizing that it needed rotary 
wing platforms.  The ability to manage these innovations 
requires flexibility and the ability to incorporate new 
technology into an organization and understand if a change 
in doctrine as a result of new innovations can reap benefits 
in the present and future. 
So how does a military develop new technology if it 
will become obsolete by the time it reaches full production?  
The case of the Comanche helicopter exemplifies this point.  
After multiple years in development and a price tag of 
almost $7 billion, the Comanche program never entered the 
final phase of production.  Investing in these programs is 
not necessarily a bad idea.  The technology that was gained 
from the program benefited the other attack aircraft of the 
Army’s fleet, even though the Comanche program was 
ultimately cancelled.  Instead of trying to build a new 
helicopter, maybe the investments should be in the 
components of a helicopter in which commercial industry 
could develop on their own helicopters for ultimate military 
use.   
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The Army has been most successful in procurement of 
helicopters when the final product was already in production 
by the manufacturer.   Van Creveld discussed the notion, as 
noted earlier, that no new major platforms had been designed 
from a doctrinal requirement laid out by people in uniform.  
The commercial industry has incentives to produce new 
equipment all the time.  By improving upon their designs, 
the commercial product becomes more marketable to not only 
the military but to the civilian sector as well. 
It’s not that special operations should not seek to 
develop new technology, but rather it seems more prudent to 
invest in better understanding the current technology and 
better applying it to the current doctrine.  If the 
conventional army wants to keep funding the development of 
new aircraft, the special operations community would be 
better off further developing doctrine for new technology 
and efficiently incorporating it into the fight for the 
future. 
The Army’s Special Operations Aviation fleet of 
aircraft is aging.  The basic airframe designs date back to 
1960s and 1970s and have, except for multiple avionics and 
navigational upgrades, remained unchanged.  In order to meet 
the requirements of the current and future wars, new 
technology needs to be employed in order to maintain a 
technological advantage over their opponents.   
Unfortunately, ARSOA is subject to the Conventional 
Army’s historical track record of innovation.  Recall that 
in Chapter Three the examples showed how innovation when 
applied to complete airframes has largely failed when an 
aircraft was designed around non-existent technology.  The 
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successes in innovation either came from utilizing an 
airframe that had already been largely tested by the 
commercial sector or through smaller scale innovations 
involving the adaptations of weapons to an existing Army 
helicopter.   
The limitations of ARSOA in capitalizing innovations 
would appear to come from the legislation that was passed to 
create MFP-11.  The funds needed to develop a new aircraft 
can quickly reach astronomical proportions as seen with the 
RAH-66 Comanche.  Also, the time used to develop an aircraft 
can act as a deterrent in finally achieving the complete 
product.  As with any new development, problems can occur 
with the design, and if time is not present and patience 
wears thin, then the program may ultimately be cancelled as 
it was with the AH-56 Cheyenne.   
The small size of the 160th lends itself to innovation, 
and should be the driver of policy change within aviation as 
a whole.  Remember that true innovators comprise only 2.5% 
of the whole as stated by the theory of diffusion of 
innovation.  The total SOCOM aircraft fleet is 5% of the 
entire Army suggesting that maybe this organization is the 
best place to look for innovation.  Instead of developing a 
new aircraft, the conventional army should use the 160th as 
a test bed for an aircraft that is already in development.  
This group has already demonstrated its ability to 
completely modify an existing aircraft and apply it to its 
missions, as it so skillfully did with the MH-60 DAP.  
Instead of looking for technology that is still beyond the 
horizon, the goal should instead be to integrate existing  
 
 42
technology, primarily a commercial aircraft in development, 
into the current doctrine and modify both the doctrine and 
aircraft to serve new needs. 
Wars are not caused by technology, but technology can 
affect the methods in which war is fought.  Innovation in 
the future should be pursued in technology that is currently 
in use.  The applicability of it may not be fully understood 
until it has been fully explored.  Attempting to predict the 
future is useful, but fully recognizing what is currently 
available, in the commercial sector, could possibly change 
the ways that missions are conducted and answer the question 
of “why didn’t we think of that before?” 
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